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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Arctic presents formidable challenges for offshore
drilling, including “extreme cold, varying forms and amount of
sea ice, seasonal darkness, high winds, extended periods of
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heavy fog, and week-long storms that approach hurricane
strength.” 1 The demanding physical conditions in the Arctic can
be expected to “both heighten the risk of an oil spill and limit
the effectiveness of oil spill response operations.” 2
Compounding these challenges is the fact that the Arctic is
remote and far from the critical resources, infrastructure, and
supplies needed to clean up chemical spills and releases. For
these reasons, before the offshore oil and gas drilling industry
expands into U.S. waters off the coast of Alaska, 3 more
information about the companies proposing to drill in the
Arctic is needed for informed decision making, meaningful
public input, and effective oversight of operator performance in
this particularly challenging and environmentally significant
setting. 4
* Wendy B. Jacobs is a Clinical Professor and Director of the Emmett Environmental
Law & Policy Clinic at Harvard Law School. Aladdine D. Joroff joined the Clinic in
2013 as a Staff Attorney after practicing law for ten years. This article represents the
culmination of several semesters of work in the Clinic by a number of students under
Professor Jacobs’ supervision. Students who contributed research, analysis and
writing to the papers on which this article is based include the following current or
recently-graduated students: David Baake; Daniel Brasil Becker; Elisabeth Costa;
Maria Parra-Orlandoni; Ephraim Olson; Mary Schnoor; and Jocelyn Sedlet.
1. Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill & Offshore Drilling,
Offshore Drilling in the Arctic: Background and Issues for the Future Consideration of
Oil and Gas Activities 10 (Staff Working Paper No. 13, 2011) [hereinafter NATIONAL
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER].
2. Id.
3. Current plans for drilling in the U.S. Arctic are limited and recent attempts have
encountered significant obstacles. See, e.g., Richard Milne et al, Oil Companies Put
Arctic Projects into Deep Freeze, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2015 (“[A] combination of political
sensitivities and unfavourable economics in the Arctic has encouraged US oil groups to
focus on more attractive opportunities . . .”); McKenzie Funk, The Wreck of the Kulluk,
N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 30, 2014 (detailing problems Shell encountered during drilling
activities in 2012); Guy Chazan, Total Warns Against Oil Drilling in Arctic, FIN.
TIMES, Sept. 25, 2012 (reporting Total SA’s position that energy companies should not
drill for crude in Arctic waters because “the risk of an oil spill in such an
environmentally sensitive area was simply too high.”).
4. See e.g., EMMETT ENVTL L. & POL’Y CLINIC, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL,
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVED OVERSIGHT OF OFFSHORE DRILLING BASED ON A
REVIEW OF 40 REGULATORY (June 2012); PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, ARCTIC
STANDARDS: RECOMMENDATIONS ON OIL SPILL PREVENTION, RESPONSE, AND SAFETY IN
THE U.S. ARCTIC OCEAN (Sept. 2013) (“[T]he [Ocean Energy Safety Advisory]
committee concluded that there is a need to modernize U.S. regulations to include
Arctic-specific standards . . .” ); Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations on the Outer
Continental Shelf— Requirements for Exploratory Drilling on the Arctic Outer
Continental Shelf, 80 Fed. Reg. 9916 (Feb. 24, 2015) (proposing Arctic-specific
operational standards for drilling related activities in the Beaufort Sea and Chukchi
Sea Planning Areas).
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This paper suggests a set of indicators to evaluate and
predict the environmental performance of companies proposing
to drill for oil or gas in the U.S. Arctic and recommends
mechanisms for improving public access to, and intra- and
inter-agency sharing of, information from companies engaged
in offshore drilling. We use the term “performance indicator” to
refer to an observable metric that correlates with an aspect of
an operator’s performance that is either too difficult to measure
directly, or too broad to be reduced to a single, precisely
quantifiable metric. 5 Performance indicators can be used to
compare an operator’s performance in a particular year against
its performance in previous years or against average industry
performance. 6
The performance indicators presented here are intended to
provide a comprehensive portrait of an operator’s
environmental performance. We selected indicators drawn from
all aspects of offshore oil and gas operations, including
exploration, drilling, production, and product transportation,
and focused on both the risk of catastrophic accidents and
environmental impacts that occur during the course of normal
operations. The collection of suggested indicators, which draws
from indicators that are used by other nations or industry
groups, is large enough to be comprehensive, but small enough
to permit effective tracking. We selected indicators for which
data is available, or reasonably easy to acquire, but in doing so
recognized existing limitations on access to relevant data. This
paper identifies barriers to information access and recommends
ways to overcome these barriers.
Much of the information that is important for evaluating—
and minimizing—safety and environmental risks is already
collected by various government agencies from companies
participating in offshore drilling in the United States. That
information, however, is not readily accessible by the public, or
even routinely shared among various interested agencies.
5. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., GUIDANCE ON DEVELOPING SAFETY
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS RELATED TO CHEMICAL ACCIDENT PREVENTION,
PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE 5 (2d ed. 2008) [hereinafter OECD Guidance] (“The
term ‘indicators’ is used to mean observable measures that provide insight into a
concept – safety – that is difficult to measure directly.”).
6. See Ian Whewell, Performance Indicators in Major Hazard Industries—An
Offshore Regulator’s Perspective 8 (2012), available at http://perma.law.harvard.edu/
0xoqT9KTsTm [hereinafter CHEM. SAFETY BD. PUB. HEARING].
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Although various federal agencies collect a significant amount of
information about offshore drilling operations, limited access to
such information impairs the ability of stakeholders (such as
host communities, investors, regulators, advocacy groups,
academics, and members of the general public) to efficiently and
effectively evaluate and influence the significant safety and
environmental impacts of offshore drilling.7
In particular, we examined the accessibility of information
currently collected by the Department of the Interior’s (“DOI”)
Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (“BSEE”)
due to BSEE’s central role in overseeing offshore safety and
environmental protection. 8 Despite the creation of BSEE and
the adoption of the Safety and Environmental Management
System (“SEMS”) regulations in the wake of the Deepwater
Horizon spill, stakeholders still lack adequate access to
critically
important
information
about
safety
and
environmental performance.
This paper highlights several obstacles to public and agency
access to the information reported to BSEE under its
regulations (30 C.F.R. Part 250, or the “Regulations”). For
instance, although the Regulations allow public access to some
of the information submitted on BSEE forms (§ 250.197(a)), the
forms cover only a portion of the information submitted to, and
relied upon by, BSEE in considering a company’s safety and
environmental impacts. Information that is submitted to BSEE
in formats other than an agency form should also be accessible
to the public, but the time and effort it takes to access such
information frustrates meaningful public oversight of safety
and environmental impacts. In addition, such access may be
subject to BSEE determinations of “necessity” of access, further
shielding from public review information relevant to assessing
safety and environmental risks.
Moreover, many documents relevant to evaluating the safety
and environmental performance of offshore operators are not
7. Operators may also benefit from shared information that informs performance
indicators by integrating them into their managerial control systems. See Paolo Perego
& Frank Hartmann, Aligning Performance Measurement Systems With Strategy: The
Case of Environmental Strategy, 45 ABACUS 397 (2009).
8. DOI’s Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (“BOEM”) collects information from
offshore drillers under regulations that similarly hamper access to information. See 30
C.F.R. § 550 (2014). Thus, although this paper focuses on BSEE, many of its
recommendations are equally applicable to BOEM.
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available through BSEE’s online Data Center. We therefore
requested samples of such material through informal
communications with BSEE and through formal Freedom of
Information Act (“FOIA”) requests. The latter resulted in
referrals to nine different points of contact at BSEE and
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (“BOEM”) over a sixweek period, at the end of which we were informed that the
plans were not “releasable” under FOIA. Our subsequent FOIA
request produced inconsistent responses from BSEE’s various
regional officers and the total response time was more than
four months. Our request for SEMS audit reports and
Corrective Action Plans (“CAPs”) triggered a delay for BSEE to
consult with the companies that submitted the reports. After
more than three months, BSEE produced documents that were
so heavily redacted as to be meaningless. These experiences
demonstrate unwarranted and logistical roadblocks to the
public’s access to information.
Agencies are not guaranteed better access than the public.
Despite BSEE’s mandate, the Regulations do not mandate
information-sharing under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act (43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)) and the Regulations (§250.106(d)), to
“cooperate” and “cooperate and consult” with relevant Federal
agencies in enforcing safety and environmental laws and
regulating lease operations. In fact, the Regulations contain
only one instance of intergovernmental collaboration, involving
cooperation between BSEE and the BOEM, another division
within DOI. There is no explicit provision for the transfer of
information from BSEE to the Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”), United States Coast Guard (“USCG”), National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”), or any
other federal agency with jurisdiction over operational aspects
of offshore drilling. BSEE purports to rely on memoranda of
understanding and agreement (“MOUs/MOAs”) to meet its
obligation to facilitate intergovernmental collaboration;
however, existing interagency agreements often involve: (i)
participation by only a subset of agencies involved in the
oversight of offshore drilling; (ii) narrow topical coverage; (iii) a
lack of clear benchmarks to assess the success of
collaborations; and (iv) vague language.
To address these deficiencies in information access, we
recommend several mechanisms to (i) facilitate meaningful
public access to safety and environmental information BSEE
collects from offshore drillers and (ii) enhance intra- and inter-
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agency sharing of information about offshore drilling. These
suggestions include steps that can be taken in the near-term,
e.g., issuing guidance, and actions that require inter-agency
coordination over a longer time frame, for example, developing
a centralized reporting system that aggregates information
about offshore drilling-related activities in a searchable and
accessible format. In particular, BSEE should:
•

Issue guidance confirming that BSEE will apply a
presumption of public access to, and need for,
information relevant to safety and environmental
impacts of offshore drilling. More particularly, such
guidance should clarify that: (i) the presumption of
public access applies to all lease and permit data and
information that BSEE receives outside of a BSEE
form, except as specifically provided otherwise in
paragraph (b) of section 250.197; and (ii) the intent of
paragraph (c) of section 250.197 is to expand public
access to otherwise proprietary geophysical and
geological data. 9

•

Require reporting entities to provide a copy of
submitted reports in a format immediately ready for
public distribution (i.e., information claimed to be
protected should be redacted).

•

Increase the scope of, and accessibility to, material
posted on BSEE’s public website.

•

Revise its reporting forms to clarify the public’s right
of immediate access to a greater portion of the
information submitted to BSEE.

•

Create a centralized reporting system for offshore
drilling-related activities to facilitate aggregation of
information collected by all of the agencies with its

9. Consistent with the executive directive to federal agencies to “adopt a
presumption in favor of disclosure” and “take affirmative steps to make information
public,” any default assumption of confidentiality needs to be shifted to a default
assumption of public access. Memorandum from President Obama to Heads of Exec.
Dept’s & Agencies, Re: Freedom of Information Act (Jan. 23, 2009), available at
http://perma.cc/7CQ8-ZUPL.
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jurisdiction in a single and searchable system
available to the public and all interested regulators.
Shared access to streamlined information within and
among agencies would benefit not only agencies with
specific authority over offshore drilling, but also
agencies such as the Securities and Exchange
Commission
(“SEC”),
whose
responsibilities
encompass consideration of the financial relevance of
the safety and environmental impacts of offshore
drilling. The SEC should be included in efforts to
improve oversight of offshore drilling, particularly as
it relates to information disclosure and access.
These recommendations for improving access to information
build on BSEE’s existing data collection processes and would
not increase the amount or type of information that BSEE
collects. Rather, the recommendations would streamline
reporting and public access to information without creating
additional substantive requirements for the regulated
community and facilitate use of environmental performance
indicators.
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II.

THE NEED FOR PERFORMANCE INDICATORS AND
IMPROVED ACCESS TO INFORMATION

In the years since the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf
of Mexico, policymakers have expressed interest in developing
performance indicators for the offshore oil and gas industry. 10
However, much of their focus has been on the development of
process safety indicators – indicators that correlate with the
risk of catastrophic accidents. 11 Far less consideration has been
given to the development of indicators that correlate with harm
to public health or the environment resulting from the routine
construction, operation, and decommissioning of offshore wells
(and ancillary equipment and operations). Yet, a true culture of
safety cannot limit its attention to the prevention of
catastrophic accidents; it must also seek to protect against the
cumulative harms resulting from an operator’s day-to-day
operations. 12
The development of environment-specific indicators is thus
crucial. The Arctic region is “home to a number of unique,
diverse, and fragile ecosystems.” 13 These ecosystems sustain a
diverse collection of species (including many marine mammals
and endangered species), as well as human communities that
depend on these ecosystems for their food and way of life. 14
These interests are threatened, not only by catastrophic
accidents, but also by environmental impacts resulting from
routine drilling activities, including, but not limited to,
exploration, construction of wells and pipelines, transportation
10. See INT’L ASS’N OIL & GAS PROD., REPORT NO. 456, PROCESS SAFETY:
RECOMMENDED PRACTICE ON KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (2011), available at
http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0jhs3Cvbynv; CHEM. SAFETY BD. PUB. HEARING, supra
note 6, at 1; COMM. ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SAFETY & ENVTL. MGMT. SYS. FOR
OUTER CONT’L SHELF OIL & GAS OPERATIONS, TRANSP. RESEARCH BD., SPECIAL
REPORT NO. 309, EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OFFSHORE SAFETY AND
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 5 (2012) [hereinafter TRANSP. RESEARCH
BD.].
11. See INT’L ASS’N OIL & GAS PROD., supra note 10.
12. See EMMETT ENVTL L. & POL’Y CLINIC, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, COMMENTS ON
BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT (BSEE) DRAFT SAFETY
CULTURE POLICY STATEMENT 3, Docket ID. BSEE-2012-0017 (2013) (“While it is
critical to prevent accidents of all sorts, accident prevention is not synonymous with
safety. A true “culture” of “safety” is broader and protects against intended as well as
unintended danger and damage to persons, property and the environment.”).
13. NATIONAL COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER, supra note 1, at 22.
14. See id. at 13–15.
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of oil and gas, and day-to-day operation of vessels, wells, and
associated structures. 15 To minimize damage to and adverse
impacts on valuable human and environmental interests,
environment-specific indicators must be developed and applied.
The National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill and Offshore Drilling highlighted the importance of access
to information about offshore drilling operations when it found
that the disaster was preventable because it was the result, in
large part, of a systemic breakdown of the environmental
review process and a corporate culture that failed to promote
safety or environmental performance. 16 Improved oversight,
including better collection of and public access to information,
is particularly important with respect to any future offshore
drilling in sensitive, complex, and controversial locations such
as the Arctic. 17
Successful oversight includes not only the collection and
processing of relevant information, but also meaningful and
timely access to and review of such material by the public and
relevant government agencies. Limited access to information
hampers the ability of agencies and other stakeholders to
perform effective and comprehensive reviews and analyses that
could contribute to improved oversight of safety and
environmental impacts from offshore drilling. Missed
opportunities for information sharing will increase costs and
inefficiencies for regulators and the regulated community
alike. Our research found that private and public stakeholders

15. See OIL IND. INT’L EXPLORATION & PROD. FORUM & UNEP, ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT IN OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION 20 (1997) (listing
environmental impacts associated with the day-to-day operation of an offshore well,
including air, water, noise and light pollution).
16. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE
DRILLING, DEEPWATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE
DRILLING: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 126–27, 224–25 (2011) [hereinafter NAT’L.
COMM’N. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT].
17. While changes have occurred since the Deepwater Horizon disaster, such as the
creation of BSEE and the SEMS program, a recent report from the United States
Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board confirms that more can, and should,
be done to improve the safety of offshore drilling, including via changes to the SEMS
program. UNITED CHEMICAL SAFETY AND HAZARD INVESTIGATION BD., Report No.
2010-10-I-OS:, EXPLOSION AND FIRE AT THE MACONDO WELL: INVESTIGATION REPORT
VOLUME 2 (2014), available at http://perma.cc/AYW2-7BEZ (“While US offshore
regulations have undergone important changes since Macondo, more can be done to
ensure a focus on preventing major accident events and to drive continuous safety
improvement.”).
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do not have sufficient or meaningful access to safety and
environment-related information submitted by industry to the
DOI (via BSEE and BOEM). Facilitating access to information
is a critical step toward effective oversight of offshore drilling.
III. SELECTION OF INDICATORS
The suggested performance indicators were chosen to track
the environmental performance of offshore oil and gas
companies operating in the U.S. Arctic. In identifying
appropriate performance indicators, we sought to include a mix
of leading, intermediate, and lagging indicators. Leading
indicators measure the strength of a company’s safeguards
against future failures in environmental performance.
Intermediate indicators track relatively minor failures in an
operator’s performance that may be predictive of more
substantial performance failures. Lagging indicators track past
failures in an operator’s environmental performance. 18 We
include several leading indicators because they help industry
and interested persons to focus on the need for changes in an
operator’s behavior before environmental harm occurs. Such a
proactive approach is necessary where, as here, an operator’s
failure to act in an environmentally responsible manner risks
degrading a precious and irreplaceable ecosystem, such as
exists in the Arctic.
We offer two general suggestions regarding the use of the
performance indicators. First, we suggest that indicators
should be measured in normalized units to allow for
meaningful comparison of the performance of different
operators, facilities or projects. Thus, units such as “barrels of
oil spilled per million barrels of oil produced” or “workplace
injuries per hours worked” should be used instead of units that
do not take into account the size of an operation, such as
“barrels of oil spilled” or “workplace injuries.”
Second, we suggest that indicators should track both the
trend of an indicator measure and its current value. It is
necessary to consider indicator trends because there may be
circumstances where the current value of an indicator may

18. See OECD Guidance, supra note 5, at 5 (describing outcome and activities
indicators).
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correlate poorly with the prospective risk posed by an operator.
For example, a single large hydrocarbon release is not
necessarily predictive of poor future performance, especially if
the operator responds to the event by implementing
comprehensive changes to its safety and environmental
compliance programs. At the same time, current value should
be considered along with the trend, to reflect the fact that
operators with consistently superior performance relative to
the industry average have less opportunity to demonstrate
improved performance.
Below we define each selected indicator and explain its
utility for evaluating an operator’s environmental performance.
We then consider whether the Department of the Interior’s
Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) or
another federal agency currently has the raw data that is
needed to establish the indicator, and if not, which agency has
the authority to collect the data. Finally, we consider how
interested members of the general public and the communities
that are potentially affected by drilling activities will be able to
access this data.
A.

LEADING INDICATORS

1.

Personal Surveys Regarding Operator’s Safety and
Environmental Management System

Definition
The SEMS 19 and SEMS II 20 Rules (collectively referred to as
the SEMS Rules) were adopted by BSEE in order to “focus
attention on the role of human error and poor organization in
accidents, drive continuous improvement in the offshore
industry’s safety and environmental records, encourage the use
of performance-based operating practices, and encourage
collaboration between industry to promote the interests of
offshore worker safety and environmental protection.” 21 The
19. Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf —Safety and
Environmental Management Systems; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,610 (Oct. 15, 2010)
(codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 250) [hereinafter SEMS Rule].
20. Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf—Revisions
to Safety and Environmental Management Systems; Final Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 20,423
(Apr. 5, 2013) (codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 250) [hereinafter SEMS II Rule].
21. 78 Fed. Reg. at 20,424.
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SEMS Rules require operators to develop and implement, inter
alia, a facility-wide hazards analysis and a job safety
analysis, 22 a set of “written operating procedures . . . for
conducting safe and environmentally sound activities,” 23 and “a
training program” to ensure that “all personnel are trained to
work safely and are aware of environmental considerations
offshore.” 24
The SEMS Rules require operators to audit their SEMS
programs at least once every three years, and to submit the
audit results to BSEE. 25 We recommend that BSEE supplement
these audits by conducting periodic surveys of an operator’s
personnel (i.e., its employees and contracted workers). These
surveys would ask personnel to answer questions related to the
operator’s compliance with the SEMS Rules and about their
own understanding of safety and environmental policies and
procedures. 26
In developing such a survey program, BSEE could draw
upon the experience of Australia’s National Offshore Petroleum
Safety
and
Environmental
Management
Authority
(NOPSEMA), which has recently started to administer a
process safety survey to offshore workers at operations under
its jurisdiction. 27 NOPSEMA’s worker survey includes
questions on eight topics: clarity of goals and responsibilities,
supervisory
involvement,
worker
professionalism/
empowerment, reporting, performance feedback, safety
values/commitment, procedures and equipment, and training. 28
Offshore workers are asked whether they agree, tend to agree,
tend to disagree, or disagree with a series of propositions, such
as “[i]n my work group, process safety concerns are secondary
to achieving production goals;” “I can report hazardous
conditions without fear of negative consequences;” and “[m]y
22. See 30 C.F.R. § 250.1911. (2014).
23. Id. § 250.1913.
24. Id. § 250.1915.
25. See id. § 250.1920(b).
26. Such interviews would also advance the recommendations of the Transportation
Research Board. See TRANSP. RESEARCH BD., supra note 10, at 5, 21.
27. See Process Safety Surveys, NOPSEMA, http://perma.law.harvard.edu/
0p66iLGFng3.
28. See NOPSEMA, OFFSHORE HEALTH AND SAFETY PERFORMANCE REPORT 23 (2010)
[hereinafter OFFSHORE HEALTH AND SAFETY PERFORMANCE REPORT], available at
http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0EYDfs6e52X.

https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol5/iss1/8

16

Jacobs and Joroff: Proposed Indicators to Measure the Environmental Responsibiity of

2015]OFFSHORE DRILLING INDICATORS & REGULATORY REFORMS 31

supervisor/immediate manager puts a high priority on process
safety through actions and not just empty slogans.” 29 Once
collected, an operator’s scores are compared to benchmarks
provided by a professional services company to determine
whether the operator’s performance is satisfactory or
unsatisfactory. 30
At present, NOPSEMA reports the results of its surveys in
aggregate, 31 which prevents interested persons from using this
data to compare the performance of different operators. We
recommend rating each operator individually, so that
interested persons (i.e., investors, regulators, and the public
generally) can encourage underperforming companies to make
improvements.
Why are such surveys useful indicators?
Survey answers concerning an operator’s compliance with
the SEMS Rules would provide important information
regarding the operator’s safety culture and, hence, its
prospective risk. The importance of an effective safety culture
in preventing catastrophic accidents cannot be overstated;
indeed, the National Commission on the BP Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling (“National
Commission”) concluded that the inadequacy of the relevant
companies’ safety cultures was “the clear root cause of the
blowout” on the Deepwater Horizon. 32 But a far more common
manifestation of an inadequate safety culture will be less
dramatic, less visible (but nonetheless unacceptable) harm to
people and the environment resulting from daily, routine
operations. Because personnel surveys will offer insight into
both catastrophic and non-catastrophic risk, they are especially
useful
for
highlighting
environmentally
responsible
performance and risk-minimizing behaviors (and the absence
thereof).
29. Offshore Process Safety Culture Survey, NOPSEMA, http://perma.
law.harvard.edu/0YTCfRqJG3s.
30. See OFFSHORE HEALTH AND SAFETY PERFORMANCE REPORT, supra note 28, at 23.
31. See id.
32. See NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE
DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE
DRILLING 133 (2011); see also id. at 217 (calling on industry to embark on “sweeping
reforms that accomplish no less than a fundamental transformation of its safety
culture”).
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In addition to providing information to regulators, investors,
and other interested persons, regular personnel surveys would
have two additional benefits: they would incentivize operators
to improve their SEMS programs and raise personnel
awareness of the SEMS program.
How will the necessary information be obtained?
Surveys could be conducted on paper or online and could be
administered by BSEE or a reliable third party. BSEE has
ample legal authority to establish such a program (though it
would need to comply with the procedures set forth in the
Paperwork Reduction Act before doing so). 33 Existing
regulations permit BSEE to evaluate a facility to determine
whether an operator’s SEMS program “is in place, addresses all
required elements, and is effective in protecting the safety and
health of workers, the environment, and preventing
incidents.” 34 BSEE has authority to verify that personnel are
following the SEMS program as part of this evaluation. 35
Therefore, BSEE has authority to conduct a personnel survey
to verify that an operator’s SEMS program addresses all
required elements and that personnel are complying with the
SEMS program.
Upon collecting survey data and determining whether an
operator’s performance on each program component is
satisfactory, BSEE can and should publish the results 36 so that
other agencies and interested members of the public can make
use of this indicator.

33. See 44 U.S.C. § 3507(a) (2006) (providing that an agency must comply with
certain procedures before conducting a “collection of information”); id. § 3502(3)
(defining “collection of information” as, inter alia, “the obtaining . . . of facts or opinions
by or for an agency, regardless of form or format” calling for “answers to identical
questions posed to . . . ten or more persons”); see also Memorandum from Cass R.
Sunstein, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Heads of Exec. Dept’s &
Agencies, & Indep. Regulatory Agencies (April 7, 2010), available at
http://perma.law.harvard.edu/077yjb6wyq1 (“The requirements of the [Paperwork
Reduction Act] apply to voluntary collections as well as to mandatory
collections . . . .”).
34. 30 C.F.R. § 250.1924(a).
35. See id. at § 250.1924(c)(1).
36. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT GUIDE 686 (2004)
(noting that agencies are generally free to make “discretionary disclosures”), available
at http://perma.cc/7TA6-5GK6.
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2.

Safety and Pollution Prevention Equipment Maintenance
Backlog

Definition
Safety and pollution prevention equipment (SPPE) are
components of an installation the failure of which could cause
or contribute substantially to a major accident or pollution
incident. 37 The purpose of SPPE is to prevent or limit the effect
of a major accident or pollution incident. SPPE maintenance is
the inspection, testing, and other maintenance needed to
ensure that SPPE “remain[s] in good working order and
continue[s] to meet defined performance standards.” 38 SPPE
maintenance backlog is a performance indicator that measures
the percentage of SPPE inspections, tests, and other
maintenance operations that are not completed on time.
We wish to emphasize that SPPE must be understood to
include computer control systems and similar software.
Automated systems are essential for the safety, reliability, and
performance of modern offshore drilling vessels, 39 and the
failure of these systems are among the most common causes of
reported incidents on these vessels. 40 Given the importance of
computer systems to process safety, it is critical that computer
inspection and maintenance be included in an indicator
tracking SPPE maintenance backlog. 41

37. 30 C.F.R. § 250.1916 (requiring operators to establish a mechanical integrity
program to ensure the integrity of “all equipment and systems used to prevent or
mitigate uncontrolled releases of hydrocarbons, toxic substances, or other materials
that may cause environmental or safety consequences”). Cf. OIL & GAS UK, HEALTH &
SAFETY REPORT 5 (2012), available at http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0Wo8JceiDpQ.
(defining “safety-critical elements” and noting that their failure to meet performance
standards can present an “immediate risk” to personnel).
38. Bob Lauder, Major Hazard (Asset Integrity) Key Performance Indicators in use in
the UK Offshore Oil and Gas Industry, CHEM. SAFETY BD. PUB. HEARING, supra note 6.
39. See Jon Espen Skogdalen & Oyvind Smogeli, Reliability of Safety Critical
Control Systems on Offshore Drilling Vessels 1 (Univ. Cal. Berkeley, Deepwater
Horizon Study Grp., Working Paper, 2011).
40. See id. at 7 (noting that computer issues were responsible for the majority of
incidents reported to the International Marine Contractors Association in 2007).
41. Computer programs fit comfortably within the definition of “equipment and
systems” that must be included in an operator’s “mechanical integrity program.” See
30 C.F.R. § 250.1916.
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Why is this a useful indicator?
An operator’s SPPE maintenance backlog is a useful
indicator because it provides information about how
consistently the operator maintains critical equipment and
systems in the face of competing concerns. This indicator offers
strong predictive value because equipment failure and ensuing
environmental harm are more likely to occur when SPPE have
not been regularly tested and maintained according to
established procedures. Once the basic parameters of a SPPE
maintenance indicator are established, the indicator could be
further improved by assigning different weight to different
equipment, such that timely inspections of comparatively more
fragile, more essential equipment could be given greater weight
than timely inspections of comparatively less fragile, less
essential equipment.
How will the necessary information be obtained?
BSEE does not currently collect an operator’s SPPE
maintenance backlog, but it has ample authority to do so.
Under the SEMS Rule, operators are required to document
“each inspection and test that has been performed on” [all
equipment and systems used to prevent or mitigate
uncontrolled releases of hydrocarbons, toxic substances, or
other materials that may cause environmental or safety
consequence]” (i.e., SPPE). 42 The SEMS Rule also requires
operators to make available to BSEE all “documents or other
information” pertaining to their SEMS programs upon BSEE’s
request. 43 Thus, BSEE has authority to obtain any documents
or information related to an operator’s SPPE maintenance
simply by requesting it. To reduce administrative costs, BSEE
could issue a notice to lessees (NTL) specifying the manner,
42. 30 C.F.R. § 250.1916(d) (requires operators to document “each inspection and
test that has been performed on [all equipment and systems used to prevent or
mitigate uncontrolled releases of hydrocarbons, toxic substances, or other materials
that may cause environmental or safety consequence]”).
43. Id. § 250.1924(b)(5); see also Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations on the Outer
Continental Shelf—Requirements for Exploratory Drilling on the Arctic Outer
Continental Shelf, 80 Fed. Reg. 9939, 9968 (Feb. 24, 2015) (including in the proposed
operational standards for drilling in the Beaufort Sea and Chukchi Sea Planning
Areas a requirement to “maintain records pertaining to testing, inspection, and
maintenance of [Source Control and Containment Equipment] for at least 10 years and
make the records available to any authorized BSEE representative upon request.”).
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timeframe, and format for submissions of requested
information. 44 Operators who are compliant with the SEMS
Rules should already have records of planned, deferred, and
delayed maintenance work; 45 therefore, organizing this data for
submission to BSEE should not be burdensome.
Upon compiling this information, BSEE should publish the
results. If BSEE declines to do so, interested persons should be
able to obtain the information by filing a FOIA request. 46 FOIA
requests are not the preferred option.
3.

Air Pollution

Definition
This indicator would track emissions of certain air pollutants
from an operator’s offshore facilities. Offshore drilling facilities
and support vessels emit nitrogen oxides (NO x ), sulfur dioxide
(SO 2 ), volatile organic compounds (VOCs), particulate matter
(e.g., black carbon) and greenhouse gases (GHGs) as the result
of flaring and venting of gases, combustion processes, mud
degreasing, and other activities. 47 These pollutants harm the
environment locally (in the case of NO X , SO 2 , VOCs and
particulate matter) and globally (in the case of GHGs). NO X
and SO 2 contribute to acid precipitation, which harms “lakes,
streams, and forests and the plants and animals that live in
these ecosystems.” 48 VOCs and NO X contribute to the
formation of ground-level ozone, which adversely “affects
sensitive vegetation and ecosystems” and can cause “loss of
species diversity and changes to habitat quality and water and
nutrient cycles.” 49 GHGs contribute to climate change, which is
44. 30 C.F.R. § 250.103 (“BSEE may issue Notices to Lessees and Operators (NTLs)
that clarify, supplement, or provide more detail about certain requirements. NTLs
may also outline what you must provide as required information in your various
submissions to BSEE.”).
45. See id. § 250.1916(c) (requiring operators to maintain written procedures to
address the “frequency of inspections and tests”); id. at § 250.1916(d).
46. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (2012).
47. See OIL IND. INT’L EXPLORATION & PROD. FORUM & UNEP, supra note 15, at 12;
BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT, YEAR 2008
GULFWIDE EMISSION INVENTORY STUDY 1–2 (2010).
ENVT’L
PROTECTION
AGENCY,
http://perma.law.harvard.
48. Acid
Rain,
edu/08LcuzGztbc.
49. Ground Level Ozone: Ecosystem Effects, ENVT’L PROTECTION AGENCY,
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causing fluctuations in the global water cycle, melting of Arctic
sea ice, ocean warming and sea level rise, ocean acidification,
and other significant environmental changes, as well as
adversely affecting human communities and ecosystems
worldwide. 50 Black carbon absorbs solar energy and as it
settles on ice and snow causes melting, thus exacerbating
environmental change and damage, particularly in the Arctic. 51
Emissions of these pollutants from offshore drilling facilities
and support vessels should be measured and regularly
reported. This information would allow regulators to take
appropriate action to protect the Arctic environment and could
be used by investors and other interested persons to advocate
for changes in operator behavior. Emissions should be reported
in normalized units, such as “kg SO 2 per million barrels of oil
produced.”
Why is this a useful indicator?
Although offshore drilling will inevitably produce some air
pollution, it is possible for operators to significantly reduce
their emissions through the use of emerging technologies and
best management practices, including more efficient gas
turbines, improved flare design, and improved well testing
procedures and technologies. 52 Operators with a strong
commitment to environmentally responsible performance and
effective internal governance mechanisms should be adopting
technologies and practices that minimize their emissions. By
contrast, operators that lack a strong commitment to
environmentally responsible performance or effective internal
governance mechanisms are unlikely to adopt emission control
technologies and practices voluntarily. Thus, emissions data
can be helpful for ascertaining which operators place the
greatest priority on environmentally responsible performance.

http://perma.law.harvard. edu/0maBY9Dehoc.
50. See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE
CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 1 (2013).
51. Effects of Black Carbon, ENVT’L PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.
gov/blackcarbon (last visited April 27, 2015).
52. OIL IND. INT’L EXPLORATION & PROD. FORUM & UNEP, supra note 15, at 13, 55.
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How will the necessary information be obtained?
Since 2005, BOEM, or its predecessor, has performed a
Gulfwide Emissions Inventory every three years. 53 To create
this inventory, BOEM requires operators to “report activity
information including facility, equipment, and fuel usage” over
the course of a year. 54 Using this data and standardized
emissions factors provided by EPA, BOEM estimates the
facility’s emissions of NO x , SO 2 , VOCs, and GHGs (among
other pollutants). 55 BOEM has published the activity
information it used to estimate the emissions of each offshore
drilling rig. 56 That information could be used to estimate and
compare the emissions and emissions intensity of each
operator’s operations.
In addition, BOEM has authority to collect monthly
emissions data for Alaska and operations in the U.S. Arctic;
indeed, BOEM already requires lessees (i.e., operators) to
monitor their emissions. 57 BOEM should do so, and the
information should be made public.
B.

INTERMEDIATE INDICATORS

1.

Civil and Administrative Violations

Definition
This indicator tracks the number of successful civil and
administrative enforcement actions taken and incidents of
noncompliance issued against an operator in response to its
safety and environmental violations. At a minimum, this
indicator should include actions taken by BSEE and BOEM in
response to violations of 30 C.F.R. Parts 250 and 550, and

53. See BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., NTL No. 2014-G01, GULFWIDE OCS
EMISSIONS INVENTORY: WESTERN GULF OF MEXICO (2013).
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT, YEAR
2008 GULFWIDE EMISSION INVENTORY STUDY F-6 (2010).
57. See 30 C.F.R. § 550.303(k) (“The lessee shall monitor, in a manner approved or
prescribed by the Regional Supervisor, emissions from the facility” and “shall submit
this information monthly in a manner and form approved or prescribed by the
Regional Supervisor.”).
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actions taken by EPA in response to violations of the Clean Air
Act and the Clean Water Act and their implementing
regulations. The indicator could thereafter be expanded to
include enforcement actions taken by other agencies, such as
the Department of Transportation or the USCG. Violations
should be categorized based on their severity (which will
typically correlate with penalty size or extensiveness of
injunctive relief). This indicator should be normalized to allow
for meaningful comparison of the performance of different
operators (e.g., in units of “major violations per million barrels
of oil”).
Why is this a useful indicator?
If an operator regularly incurs penalties for violating safety
and environmental laws, it is likely that the operator has
systemic problems with its compliance programs and safety
culture. Conversely, if an operator has a relatively spotless
record, it is likely that the operator has strong compliance
programs and a strong safety culture. Therefore, an operator’s
compliance record is a predictor of its future safety and
environmental performance. However, it must be remembered
that offshore drilling is inherently risky; hence, even operators
with a relatively spotless compliance record must remain
vigilant to risk at all times. 58
How will the necessary information be obtained?
BSEE has published a list of all incidents of noncompliance
issued to offshore operators since 2000 59 and all civil penalties
assessed against offshore operators since 1998. 60 This data
could be organized by operator, categorizing violations based on
their severity, and normalized to account for differences in each
operator’s output.
By contrast, EPA has not routinely made information about
its past enforcement actions against offshore operators publicly

58. JAMES A. BAKER ET AL., THE REPORT OF THE BP U.S. REFINERIES INDEPENDENT
SAFETY REVIEW PANEL, at i (2007).
59. Incidents of Noncompliance, BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVT’L ENFORCEMENT,
http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0dn1hqNynMP.
60. Civil Penalties and Appeals, BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVT’L ENFORCEMENT,
http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0iSR5TXq9Ay.
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accessible. EPA should establish a database similar to BSEE’s
database to facilitate access by BSEE, other agencies,
investors, and other members of the public. 61 Until EPA creates
such a database, the information is available through FOIA. 62
2.

Kick Frequency and Kick Response Time

Definition
This indicator would measure an operator’s ability to prevent
and manage well kicks (also referred to as “well control
incidents”). A kick occurs when the weight of “drilling mud”
(the liquid used to counterbalance upward pressure exerted by
the hydrocarbon formation) is insufficient to maintain
equilibrium within the formation, causing fluids to flow
upwards through the well and drill pipe. 63 A kick can cause a
blowout unless personnel promptly take the appropriate
response action (i.e., closing the well’s blowout-preventer
valves). 64
Following safety expert Professor Andrew Hopkins of
Australian National University in Canberra, 65 we suggest two
indicators related to well kicks: the number of kicks per well
per year (kick frequency) 66 and the average time it takes
personnel to notice and respond to a well kick (kick response
time).
Why are these useful indicators?
Kick frequency is a useful indicator because it is directly
correlated with blowout risk (since a kick “is an immediate
precursor to a blowout” 67). Moreover, because this indicator will

61. See, e.g., Inspections and Enforcement: Incident Statistics and Summaries,
BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVT’L ENFORCEMENT, http://perma.law.harvard.
edu/09YDEEf31kR.
62. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (2012).
63. See NAT’L COMM’N REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 16, at 91.
64. See id.; Andrew Hopkins, Safety Indicators for Offshore Drilling 6 and 8
(Chemical Safety Board, Working Paper, 2012) (noting that a kick is “the immediate
precursor to a blowout.”).
65. See Hopkins, supra note 64, at 6, 8.
66. If data are available, it may be preferable to measure frequency in terms of kicks
per well completion.
67. Hopkins, supra note 64, at 6.
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track a single aspect of operator performance (pressure
management), 68 it should be easy for operators to modify their
behavior in response to unacceptable performance (e.g., by
providing additional training to relevant personnel or providing
additional resources). If an operator consistently reports high
kick frequency relative to others in the industry (even after
adjustments are made for the fact that some wells are
inherently more likely to kick 69), this may indicate that the
operator undervalues safety relative to the industry.
Like kick frequency, kick response time is directly correlated
with blowout risk. This is because gaseous hydrocarbons
expand with ever-increasing speed as they travel up the
wellbore, 70 causing the strength of the kick to increase with
time. Like kick frequency, kick response time tracks a single
aspect of operator performance (in this case, kick
management). Thus, an operator must modify its behavior to
address unacceptable performance, and its repeated failure to
do so is likely indicative of a corporate culture that
undervalues safety.
Kick frequency and kick response time have one additional
advantage as indicators: they measure unambiguous events
that are recorded in real time by the operator’s computer
systems. 71 For this reason, they are less open to interpretation
or manipulation than other indicators. 72
How will the necessary information be obtained?
BSEE already requires operators to report well kicks as part
of their weekly (daily, in Alaska) Well Activity Report, 73 and
reports all well control incidents on its website, along with the
identity of the responsible operator. 74 This data provides a
68. See generally NAT’L COMM’N REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 16, at 91
(noting that kick frequency is largely a function of the crew’s ability to monitor and
adjust the density of the drilling mud to maintain equilibrium).
69. These adjustments could be made by using the Dodson Mechanical Risk Index,
which assigns wells to one of five categories based on its “complexity” (i.e., its
propensity to kick). See Hopkins, supra note 64, at 6–7.
70. See NAT’L COMM’N REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 16, at 109.
71. See Hopkins, supra note 64, at 6, 8.
72. Id.
73. Form BSEE-0133, available at http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0BBrSPBpYzD.
74. See Loss of Well Control: Statistics and Summaries, BUREAU OF SAFETY AND
ENVT’L ENFORCEMENT, http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0YD335ZSsgg.
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usable indicator when organized by operator and well type. 75
Thus, indicators could be reported in units such as “kicks at
high complexity wells per year.” BSEE has ample authority to
require the reporting of kick response time. 76 It could issue an
NTL requiring operators to include this information in their
Well Activity Reports. 77
C.

LAGGING INDICATORS

1.

Loss of Primary Containment Events

Definition
This indicator tracks the number of loss of primary
containment (LOPC) events occurring at an operator’s wells,
building upon the work of the American Petroleum Institute
and the American National Standards Institute (API/ANSI).
API/ANSI define LOPC as “[a]n unplanned or uncontrolled
release of any material . . . including non-toxic and nonflammable materials” from the primary vessel or equipment
intended to hold it. 78 API/ANSI has established two tiers of
LOPC. Tier 1 events involve fatalities, hospital admissions,
injuries causing “days away from work,” community
evacuations, fires or explosions resulting in at least $25,000 in
direct cost to the company, or discharges exceeding a specified

75. See Hopkins, supra note 64, at 6–7 (discussing the Dodson Mechanical Risk
Index, which assigns wells to one of five categories based on its propensity to kick).
76. See 30 C.F.R. § 250.469 (providing that an operator may be required to submit
any record maintained pursuant to section 250.466); 30 C.F.R. § 250.466(g) (requiring
operators to maintain, inter alia, information “required by the District Manager in the
interests of resource evaluation, waste prevention, conservation of natural resources,
and the protection of correlative rights, safety, and environment”).
77. Interested members of the public could request BSEE to issue such an NTL. See
5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (2012) (“[A]n interested person may appear before an agency . . . for
the presentation . . . of an issue, request, or controversy . . . in connection with an
agency function.”). If BSEE did not grant such a request, interested persons could file
a petition for rulemaking with the agency. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2012) (“Each agency
shall give an interested person the right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or
repeal of a rule.”); 43 C.F.R. Part 14 (DOI regulations implementing section 553(e)).
Interested persons should encourage BSEE to make this information public if it begins
collecting it.
78. See AM. PETROLEUM INST. & AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST., PROCESS SAFETY
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR THE REFINING AND PETROCHEMICAL INDUSTRIES:
RECOMMENDED PRACTICE § 3.1.17, at 754 (1st ed. 2010); see also id. § 3.1.4 (defining
“containment, primary”).
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mass threshold over a one hour period. 79 Tier 2 events are non–
Tier 1 events that involve a reportable injury to any worker,
fires or explosions resulting in at least $2,500 of direct cost to
the company, or discharges exceeding a less stringent mass
threshold over a one-hour period. 80 (Tier 2 events are treated
as an intermediate indicator on our Table 1).
Related indicators could be established to track the mass of
material released from primary containment. All indicators
should be reported in normalized units (e.g., “Tier 1 events per
million barrels of oil produced;” “mass of material released per
million barrels of oil produced”).
Why is this a useful indicator?
Tier 1 events are classified as lagging indicators because
they cause significant harm to people or the environment in the
form of fatalities, injuries, explosions, fires, or releases of
chemicals and pollutants. For this reason, the number of Tier 1
events that occur on an offshore rig can serve as an important
lagging indicator of the operator’s safety and environmental
performance. Repeated Tier 1 events indicate that an operator’s
process safety and environmental compliance programs are
ineffective, and that the operator is ill-equipped to prevent
future process safety or environmental incidents. By contrast, a
relatively spotless history should inspire confidence that an
operator has strong process safety and environmental
compliance programs. However, it must be remembered that
“[t]he passing of time without a process accident is not
necessarily an indication that all is well;” 81 hence, operators
and regulators must remain vigilant to risk at all times.
Tier 2 events can be considered lagging or intermediate
indicators. 82 These events are typically associated with some
harm to people or the environment, and although this harm is
not as significant as that associated with a Tier 1 event, it is an
important indicator in its own right. Moreover, because Tier 1
79. See id. § 5.2; see also id. at 10 Table 1 (listing mass thresholds for Tier 1 events).
80. See id. § 6.2; see also id. at 12 Table 2 (listing mass thresholds for Tier 2 events).
81. BAKER ET AL., supra note 58, at 3.
82. See INT’L ASS’N OIL & GAS PROD., supra note 10, at 3 (“[M]ost LOPC events will
have no actual consequences but are still failures and therefore lagging outcomes, but
low consequence LOPC events also provide leading information when predicting the
likelihood of major incidents with serious consequences.”).
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and Tier 2 events typically have a common etiology, the
number of Tier 2 events that have occurred at an operator’s
facilities can be expected to correlate with the likelihood that
the operator will experience a Tier 1 event in the future.
Hence, Tier 2 events serve an important predictive function as
well.
How will the necessary information be obtained?
Operators are already required to report certain LOPC to
BSEE, including all reportable releases of H 2 S, all gas releases
that initiate equipment or process shutdown, and all LOPC
that cause fatalities, injuries, fires, or explosions, or that
require personnel to muster for evacuation or that cause
property or equipment damage greater than $25,000. 83 BSEE
includes information about these events on its website. 84 This
information can be organized by operator and normalized to
account for differences in each operator’s output. To determine
whether an event listed on these databases involved LOPC,
reference should be made to the “incident description” provided
for the event to confirm that the incident involved “[a]n
unplanned or uncontrolled release of any material” and not, for
example, a fire caused by an engine malfunction.
BSEE’s existing reporting requirements cover many, but not
all, Tier 1 events and some Tier 2 events (e.g., operators are not
currently required to report LOPC events involving superthreshold releases of hazardous substances unless the release
caused another reportable event 85). BSEE has authority to
require operators to include information about otherwise nonreportable LOPC in their Well Activity Reports. 86 BSEE could
83. See 30 C.F.R. § 250.188. (2014).
84. See Inspections and Enforcement: Incident Statistics and Summaries, BUREAU OF
SAFETY AND ENVT’L ENFORCEMENT, http://perma.law.harvard.edu/09YDEEf31kR.
85. These releases would probably also be exempted from the reporting
requirements of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
(EPCRA). 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001–11050. (2012). Although EPCRA generally requires
facility owners to report releases of “extremely hazardous substance[s],” there is an
exception for releases that result in exposure to persons solely within the site where
the facility is located. 42 U.S.C. § 11004(a)(1), (4).
86. See 30 C.F.R. § 250.469 (providing that an operator may be required to submit
any record maintained pursuant to section 250.466); id. § 250.466(g) (requiring
operators to maintain, inter alia, information “required by the District Manager in the
interests of resource evaluation, waste prevention, conservation of natural resources,
and the protection of correlative rights, safety, and environment”).
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issue an NTL on its own initiative or in response to a request.
Similarly, interested persons could encourage BSEE to issue an
NTL requiring operators to report the mass of material
released from primary containment and include LOPC data in
Well Activity Reports.
2.

Oil Releases

Definition
This indicator would track the number of oil releases that
occur at an operator’s offshore facilities or during product
transport (i.e., from oil pipelines or tankers). Following the
system adopted by the U.K. Health and Safety Executive,
releases could be classified as major, significant, or minor,
depending upon the mass of oil released and the potential of
the release to cause a major accident upon ignition. 87
Why is this a useful indicator?
Oil releases can cause major environmental impacts and
threaten public and personnel safety; hence, an operator that is
unable to prevent oil releases will be at a higher risk of both
forms of harm. Large-scale releases can cause severe habitat
destruction and widespread plant and animal mortality, 88 and
even small releases can cause unacceptable environmental
harm (e.g., marine mammal mortality as the result of oil
inhalation or ingestion). 89 Thus, responsible operators minimize
if not eliminate the number of oil releases that occur at their
facilities.
How will the necessary information be obtained?
Releases within BSEE’s Jurisdiction. Operators are already
required to report to BSEE all oil releases at their offshore
facilities. 90 Pursuant to BSEE regulations and a Memorandum
87. See Hydrocarbon Releases System: Internet Help File, HEALTH & SAFETY EXEC.,
http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0Uh8KNh6jMZ (listing mass and mass flow rate
thresholds for “major” and “significant” releases).
88. See generally Guidelines on Biological Impacts of Oil Pollution INT’L PETROLEUM
INDUS. ENVTL. CONSERVATION ASS’N (IPIECA)], (Jan. 1991).
89. See NOAA MARINE FISHERIES SERV., IMPACTS OF OIL ON MARINE MAMMALS AND
SEA TURTLES, available at http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0uiAJ7jC6e5.
90. See 30 C.F.R. § 254.46 (2011) (BSEE’s reporting requirements for oil spills).
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of Understanding between the Department of the Interior
(DOI) and the Department of Transportation (DOT), pipeline
facilities that are under the control of a “producing operator”
are covered by this rule. 91 Operators are required to report
spills of one barrel or more immediately, 92 and to submit a
written follow up report within fifteen days of the end of the
spill. The follow up report must include the cause of the
release, its location and volume, and the response action
taken. 93 Releases of less than one barrel must be reported to
BSEE as part of the Performance Measures Data included in
Form BSEE-0131. 94
BSEE publishes annual data for oil spills of fifty barrels or
more and identifies the operator responsible for each spill. 95
BSEE does not distinguish between releases from pipelines
and releases from other offshore facilities; data for both types
of releases can be found in the same report. This data could be
organized by operator and normalized by reference to the
number of releases per million barrels of oil produced in order
to account for differences in each operator’s output.
BSEE also publishes annual data for spills of one barrel or
greater, but does not identify the responsible operator. 96
Without the identity of the responsible operator, the data on
smaller spills is not useful for comparing operators’
performance. BSEE can and should identify the operators
responsible for each recorded spill in future reports.
Releases within PHMSA’s Jurisdiction. Pursuant to a
Memorandum of Understanding between DOI and DOT,

91. See 30 C.F.R. § 254.6 (defining “facility” to include pipelines not covered by the
Deepwater Port Act of 1974); Memorandum of Understanding Between the
Department of Transportation and the Department of the Interior Regarding Outer
Continental Shelf Pipelines 2 (Dec. 10, 1996) (“DOT will [have jurisdiction over] all
OCS transportation pipelines beginning downstream of the point at which operating
responsibility transfers from a producing operator to a transporting operator.”).
92. See 30 C.F.R. § 254.46(b).
93. See id. at § 254.46(b)(2).
94. See id. at § 254.46(b)(2).
95. See BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT, SUMMARY OCS
SPILLS OF 50 BARRELS (2,100 GALLONS) AND GREATER, CALENDAR YEAR 1964–2012,
http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0tDEzCH8gsJ.
96. See BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT, All Petroleum
Spills > 1 Barrel from OCS Oil & Gas Activities by Size Category and Year, 1964 to
2013,
http://www.bsee.gov/uploadedFiles/BSEE/Enforcement/Accidents_and_
Incidents/All%20Spills%201964-2011.pdf (last visited April 27, 2015).
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pipeline facilities that are under the control of a “transporting
operator” are under the jurisdiction of DOT’s Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA). 97
PHMSA requires pipeline owners to report all spills of five
barrels or more. 98 PHMSA publishes these incidents on its
website, 99 and provides a page for each operator that lists the
offshore incidents for which the operator is responsible. 100
Hence, interested persons already have access to most of the
information necessary to track offshore spills that occur within
PHMSA’s jurisdiction; additional data (e.g., release mass) could
be obtained by filing a FOIA request.
Releases from Tankers. It is expected that oil produced
offshore in the Arctic will be transported to shore by
pipeline. 101 However, in the event that operators begin
transporting oil by tanker, releases from these vessels should
also be tracked. Existing regulations require responsible
persons to notify the Coast Guard immediately in the event of
an oil release from a vessel. 102 The Coast Guard makes
available on the National Response Center website annual data
regarding incidents to which it responds. 103 Interested persons
should refer to this data in the event that operators begin
97. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of Transportation
and the Department of the Interior Regarding Outer Continental Shelf Pipelines,
supra note 91, at 2-3.
98. See 49 C.F.R. § 195.50(b) (2012).
99. See Significant Pipeline Incidents: Hazardous Liquids (Offshore), PIPELINE AND
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION,
https://hip.phmsa.dot.gov/
analyticsSOAP/saw.dll?Portalpages (last visited April 27, 2015) (To determine the
identity of the responsible operator, click on the number of incidents that occurred
during a given year. This brings up a page with a table listing incidents by their cause.
Clicking on the incident number total brings up a third page that identifies the
operator responsible for each release and the amount of property damage that
resulted.).
100. See e.g., Operator Information PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY
ADMINISTRATION, (Mar. 6, 2015, 9:17 PM), http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/reports/
operator/OperatorReport_opid_31759 .html.
101. See BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT, OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL
AND GAS LEASING PROGRAM 2012–2017: FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT 2–7 (2012) (“Oil from the Beaufort Sea and Chukchi Sea Planning
Areas would be transported by new subsea and overland pipelines to the TAPS [TransAlaska Pipeline System] and delivered to the marine terminal facilities in Valdez,
where it would be loaded on tankers and shipped primarily to West Coast ports.”).
102. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.120(a)(1) (2010).
RESPONSE
CTR.,
DOWNLOAD
NRC
DATA,
103. See
NAT’L
http://www.nrc.uscg.mil/Default.aspx.
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using tankers to transport oil from offshore facilities in the
Arctic.
3.

Work-Related Fatalities and Reportable Injuries

Definition
This indicator tracks the number of work-related fatalities
and reportable injuries that occur at an operator’s offshore
facilities. Tracking BSEE’s regulations, we use the term
reportable injury to refer to injuries that either require the
evacuation of the injured person from the offshore facility or
result in one or more days away from work or one or more days
of restricted work or job transfer. 104
Why are these useful indicators?
A work-related fatality or reportable injury is the ultimate
failure of an operator’s safety compliance program. An operator
that consistently fails to protect its workers from on-the-job
harm is unlikely to be effectively addressing other safety and
environmental concerns. Such an operator should not be
permitted to operate in a sensitive area such as the Arctic until
it is able to show that it has made significant improvements to
its compliance programs.
How will the necessary information be obtained?
BSEE already requires operators to report all fatalities and
reportable injuries that occur at their offshore facilities. 105
BSEE publishes annual fatality and reportable injury data on
its website, along with identification of the responsible
operator. 106

104. See 30 C.F.R. § 250.188(a)(2), (b)(1) (2012).
105. See 30 C.F.R. §§ 250.188(a)(1), (a)(2), (b)(1).
106. BSEE, FATALITIES – STATISTICS AND SUMMARIES 2007–2014, http://
www.bsee.gov/Inspection-and-Enforcement/Accidents-and-Incidents/Fatalities/; BSEE,
INJURIES – STATISTICS AND SUMMARIES 2007–2014, http://www.bsee.gov/Inspectionand-Enforcement/Accidents-and-Incidents/Injuries/ (last visited April 27, 2015).
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IV. SUMMARY OF PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
Performance indicators are crucial to the ability of
regulators, affected communities, and the public to determine
which drilling companies should be entrusted with access to
the nation’s most sensitive and pristine resource areas,
including the Arctic. Regulators and the public need
meaningful access to information in order to assess a
company’s environmental performance and effectively exercise
oversight of drilling activities. Accordingly, we now turn to
ways to improve information access.

V.

ANALYSIS OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION

The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (43 U.S.C. § 1331 et
seq.) and the Regulations establish a regime under which
industry transfers to BSEE significant amounts of information,
including material relevant to evaluating safety and
environmental impacts of offshore drilling activities. These
information submission requirements apply across the life of a
project. For instance, operators must submit certain reports for
approval by BSEE before altering drilling procedures, thereby
providing BSEE with information to assess environmental
risks while the underlying operations are still in the planning
stages. 107 Operators are also required to provide or make
available to BSEE periodic updates as well as event-triggered
reports, thus giving BSEE information for continually
monitoring compliance through the life of a project. 108 In
addition, BSEE may inspect drill sites, with or without prior
notice to the operator. 109
107. See, e.g., 30 C.F.R. §§ 250.286-295 (2012) (regarding Deepwater Operations
Plans and Conceptual Plans), 250.410-18 (regarding permits to drill wells). BOEM also
collects information from operators prior to the commencement of exploration and/or
development and production activities. See, e.g., 30 C.F.R. § 550.201 (regarding timing
for submitting Exploration Plans, Development and Production Plans, Development
Operations Coordination Documents and Conservation Information Documents).
108. See, e.g., 30 C.F.R. §§ 250.187-190 (regarding incident reporting), 250.192
(regarding reporting relating to hurricanes and other natural occurrences), 250.516
(regarding blowout prevention system testing).
109. See, e.g., 30 C.F.R. §§ 250.130-132, 301 (regarding inspections).
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The breadth of information available to and collected by
BSEE ranges from general plans to the technical minutia of
individual site operations, including, but not limited to: H 2 S
contingency plans; Blowout Protection procedures; Deepwater
Operations Plans; SEMS plans, audited reports and records;
equipment design and performance specifications; maintenance
test results; maps and schematic drawings of proposed drill
sites; geological and geophysical data; and incident reports
related to events such as workplace injuries and evacuations.
Despite the scope of information available to BSEE, public
access to the information is limited.
A.

UNNECESSARILY RESTRICTED PUBLIC ACCESS TO
INFORMATION ESSENTIAL TO EVALUATLING
SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS

A 2009 Presidential Memorandum directs federal agencies to
“take affirmative steps to make information public” and adopt
“a presumption of disclosure” in processing requests for
information under FOIA. 110 In this vein, BSEE’s objectives,
articulated in an agency manual, include “mak[ing]
information available to the public even before a request is
made” and “[a]dminister[ing] the FOIA with a clear
presumption in favor of disclosure.” 111 However, these goals are
not reflected in BSEE’s Regulations or in its actions,
particularly as they relate to information relevant to safety and
environmental concerns. In particular, the Regulations
themselves lack a clear statement adopting a presumption in
favor of disclosure and contain confusing language regarding
the public availability of information used by BSEE to “promote
operational safety” or “protect the environment.” 112 In addition,
as discussed below, the agency makes subjective decisions as to
when and to whom certain information should be available.
1.

Restrictions Arising from Unclear Regulations
The catchall provision governing public access to information

110. Memorandum from President Obama, supra note 9.
111. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, BSEE Manual, Version No. 001, Administrative
Series, Part 383, Chapter 15 (Nov. 1, 2011), available at http://perma.cc/P5B2-FZDH.
112. 30 C.F.R. § 250.197(c) (2012).
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reported to BSEE, 30 C.F.R. section 250.197, 113 neither
definitively gives the public access to information BSEE uses to
assess threats to safety and the environment nor does it
provide for a presumption of public access. Section 250.197 is
divided into three parts:
“Paragraphs (a) and (b). . .describe what data and
information will be made available to the public without
the consent of the lessee, under what circumstances,
and in what time period. Paragraph (c). . . describes
what data and information will be made available for
limited inspection without the consent of the lessee, and
under what circumstances.” 114
Paragraph (a) of section 250.197 provides that information
submitted on BSEE forms will be available to the public upon
submission, with the exception of enumerated entries on seven
forms that may be withheld for a specified period of time.
While paragraph (a) creates a mechanism by which most of the
information submitted on BSEE forms is to be immediately
made available to the public, it covers only a portion of the
information that BSEE receives from offshore operators and
relies upits analysis and decision-making. 115 For instance,
SEMS audit results and resulting Corrective Action Plans
(“CAPs”) are not reported on BSEE forms. Thus, access to
BSEE forms does not provide sufficient information to evaluate
safety and environmental risks posed by offshore drilling.
Paragraph (b) of section 250.197 addresses public access to
lease and permit data and information that is submitted to
BSEE in a format other than on a BSEE form. Such
information is accessible according to a table identifying nine
scenarios, each of which stipulates specific categories of
information BSEE may release and the amount of time BSEE
may delay access to the information. With respect to the scope
of information at issue, in all but two of the scenarios the

113. BSEE’s authority to ask reporting entities for additional copies of reports “for
public information” is subject to the exemptions from public disclosure articulated in
section 250.197. See 30 C.F.R. § 250.186(b).
114. 30 C.F.R. § 250.197.
OCS
OPERATION
FORMS,
available
at
115. Compare,
e.g.,
BSEE
http://www.bsee.gov/About-BSEE/Doing-Business-with-BSEE/OCS-OperationForms/index/ (last visited April 30, 2015) (BSEE’s list of Outer Continental _Shelf
Operation Forms), with 30 C.F.R. 250, Subpart S (requirements for SEMS-related
records.).
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enumerated information that BSEE will release is limited to
geophysical and geological data or information. 116 Nongeophysical and geological data outside of a BSEE form, such
as the information in SEMS audit reports and CAPs, is not
declared by the Regulations to be within the scope of material
available to the public. However, a blanket withholding of
documents that is not tied to a specific FOIA exemption would
be a violation of the statute. 117 Any limitation on public access
to information should apply only to material that BSEE
determines is subject to a FOIA exemption from disclosure,
such as: (i) the rarely used exemption for geological and
geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning
wells; or (ii) the protection for trademarks and confidential
business information.
Even when information should be released under paragraph
(b), in some scenarios the Regulations allow BSEE to curtail
public access to information for two, ten, or even fifty years
after submission or issuance of a permit. 118 In other instances,
the timing of access is even less clear as the availability of
some information related to safety and environmental
protection is contingent on determinations by BSEE as to
whether public access is “necessary.” 119 The Regulations,
116. The other categories of information addressed in paragraph (b) are: (i)
“[d]escriptions of downhole locations, operations, and equipment” related to well
operations; and (ii) any data or information obtained from beneath unleased land as a
result of a well deviation that has not been approved by BSEE. 30 C.F.R. §
250.197(b)(7), (8).
117. See, e.g., Dep’t of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 78 (2001) (“Upon request, FOIA mandates disclosure of records held by a federal agency
unless the documents fall within enumerated exemptions. ‘[T]hese limited exemptions
do not obscure the basic policy that disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective of
the Act, [c]onsistent with the Act’s goal of broad disclosure, these exemptions have
been consistently given a narrow compass.’”) (internal citations omitted); U.S. Dep’t of
Justice v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 8 (1988) (“‘[t]he mandate of the FOIA calls for broad
disclosure of Government records,’ and for this reason we have consistently stated that
FOIA exemptions are to be narrowly construed.”) (internal citations omitted).
118. See, e.g., 30 C.F.R. § 250.197(b)(6) (making geological data and analyzed
geological information for leases in effect beyond the primary term specified in the
lease available two years after the required submittal date); id. at § 250.197(b)(4)
(making geophysical data, processed geophysical information and interpreted G&G
information for leases still in effect available ten years after submission); id. at §
250.197(b)(9) (making certain geophysical data available fifty years after BOEM issues
a permit).
119. See, e.g., 30 C.F.R. § 250.197(b)(2) (providing that certain information “collected
with high-resolution systems . . . to comply with safety or environmental protection
requirements” may be released 60 days after BSEE receives the information if a
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however, do not contain criteria for determining whether public
access to information is “necessary.”
Finally, paragraph (c) of section 250.197 provides limited
public access to “G&G data and information” that BSEE uses to
“[p]romote operational safety” or “[p]rotect the environment.”
Such information is only available for “limited inspection. . . by
persons with a direct interest in related BSEE decisions and
issues in specific geographic areas, and who agree in writing”
to keep the information reviewed confidential. 120 The
Regulations neither define “G&G data and information” nor
provide guidance as to what constitutes a “direct interest” in a
BSEE decision or issue. The regulatory history of paragraph (c)
suggests that the provision is intended to relate to otherwise
proprietary geological and geophysical data that is relevant to
parties who are “directly affected by [BSEE] decisions
regarding units, reservoirs, operations, environmental
protection, field determinations, and royalty relief. . .” 121
However, in the absence of a clear mandate establishing a
public disclosure default, this provision could be misinterpreted
to restrict public access to non-protected information used by
BSEE to protect safety and the environment.
These types of delays and absence of standards governing
decisions by BSEE personnel as to whether there is a “need” for
or “direct interest” in information that warrants disclosure
diminish the value of access provided by section 250.197 and
frustrate meaningful public oversight of safety and
environmental impacts.
2.

Restrictions Arising from Logistical Issues

Even when information is required to be accessible by 30
C.F.R. Part 250, there are roadblocks to retrieving it from
BSEE. Despite BSEE’s creation of an on-line Data Center, 122
information is missing from BSEE’s website or difficult to find.
For example:
•

SEMS

audit

reports

and

CAPs

(examples

of

regional supervisor from the division deems it “necessary”).
120. 30 C.F.R. § 250.197(c).
121. 67 Fed. Reg. 46,942, 46,943 (Jul. 17, 2002).
122. Data Center, BSEE, available at http://www.data.bsee.gov/homepg/data_center/
index.asp (last visited April 27, 2015).
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documents relevant to evaluating the safety and
environmental performance of offshore operators) are
not posted in the Data Center, and some categories of
information in the Data Center are available only
from a particular BSEE office (e.g., the Gulf of Mexico
OCS Region);
•

In some instances, documents that must now be filed
with BSEE, such as H 2 S contingency plans, are part
of BOEM’s electronic dataset rather than BSEE’s. 123 A
division of material between BSEE’s and BOEM’s
websites is not, in and of itself, problematic, nor
perhaps unexpected given the fact that the two
agencies used to be a single entity. But the lack of
notice to this effect hinders public access; and

•

Even if one knows which agency website to search,
reports like H 2 S contingency plans are often not
available as stand-alone documents, but only as
appendices to other lengthy documents. Without a
more refined search tool or index, retrieving
information from BSEE’s Data Center is hit-or-miss
and time-consuming.

The type of searchable database that aggregates operating
information submitted to multiple agencies discussed later in
this paper would address these issues. However, such a system
would take time to develop, so in the interim we recommend
that BSEE expand and improve its online Data Center. For
example, enhancing the aggregation of information and search
capabilities, because making material available online avoids
both the time lag in response associated with FOIA requests
and the administrative burden such requests place on BSEE.
Until the system is upgraded, however, it is essential for the
public to be able to receive material directly from BSEE. To
evaluate the ease of access to environment and safety-related
information, we requested copies of H 2 S contingency plans
123. 30 C.F.R. § 250.490(f) (2012) (requiring H2S Contingency Plans to be submitted
to and approved by BSEE District Managers prior to beginning operations). Prior to
October 2011, BSEE and BOEM were a single federal agency under the regulatory
umbrella of the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement
(“BOEMRE”), and H2S Contingency Plans were submitted to BOEMRE.
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submitted by offshore operators to BSEE, first through a series
of informal oral and written communications with BSEE and
then through a formal FOIA request. 124
We initiated outreach to BSEE on October 24, 2013 by
calling BSEE’s Gulf Coast OCS Regional Office to request
copies of H 2 S contingency plans filed pursuant to the
Regulations within the last two years. BSEE representatives
referred us to different specialists within their offices and
BOEM, at times transferring the caller to defunct telephone
extensions and channeling most written communication to
generic email accounts such as GulfPublicInfo@bsee.gov and
Foiaofficegulfofmexicoocsregion@boem.gov. In all, we requested
the H 2 S contingency plans in communications with nine
individuals as well as through the aforementioned email
accounts to no avail.
On November 6, 2013, a representative from BSEE’s Gulf
Coast OCS Regional Office informed us that the requested H 2 S
contingency “[p]lans are not releasable even under FOIA.” 125
When asked to specify the FOIA exemption(s) being invoked,
the BSEE representative referred us to BOEM’s FOIA request
email account without answering the question. 126 BOEM
responded to our inquiry by suggesting that we submit a FOIA
request. 127
Because BSEE referred us to BOEM, we filed FOIA requests
for H 2 S contingency plans with both bureaus, asking for copies
of plans filed with either bureau, or its predecessor. 128 BOEM
responded that the documents requested “are not located in
BOEM.” 129 The regional offices of BSEE each responded
124. H2S contingency plans, which are relevant from a safety and environmental
perspective because releases of H2S can be fatal to humans and marine species, are
neither submitted on a BSEE form nor explicitly excluded from public access by the
Regulations.
125. Email from Roberta S. McMahon, Government Information Specialist (FOIA),
Gulf of Mexico OCS Region, BSEE, to Daniel Becker, student, Emmett Environmental
Law & Policy Clinic (EELPC), Harvard Law School (Nov. 6, 2013) (on file with author).
126. Email from Roberta S. McMahon, Government Information Specialist (FOIA),
Gulf of Mexico OCS Region, BSEE, to Daniel Becker, student, EELPC, Harvard Law
School (Nov. 8, 2013) (on file with author).
127. Email from Jeremy Williams, BOEM, to Daniel Becker, student, EELPC,
Harvard Law School (Dec. 2, 2013) (on file with author).
128. This time, the request focused on plans filed more than two years before the
date of the request to avoid any risk of the request being denied based on opportunities
for delayed disclosure in 30 C.F.R. § 250.197(b) (2013).
129. Letter from Steven K. Waddell, Chief, FOIA/Records Office, Gulf of Mexico OCS
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somewhat differently to the identical FOIA request: (i) the
Alaska region referred us to an H 2 S contingency plan available
on BOEM’s website; (ii) the Pacific Region forwarded copies of
several H 2 S contingency plans; and (iii) the Gulf of Mexico
Region claimed that the request for H 2 S contingency plans
sought commercial or financial information that triggered a
“requirement” for BSEE to consult with the submitter prior to
responding to the FOIA request. In total, the response from
BSEE took over four months. 130
We filed a separate FOIA request with BSEE asking for
specific SEMS audit reports, CAPs, and completed BSEE
Forms 0131 (on which operators submit Performance Measures
Data). BSEE acknowledged receipt of the FOIA request and, in
response to an inquiry two months later, informed us that (i)
the request was still in the FOIA office queue for processing
and, (ii) because it determined that the requested documents
included commercial confidential information, the agency had
notified the submitters of the reports of the request and was
awaiting their response. 131 The documents that BSEE sent us
approximately six weeks later were so heavily redacted that
they were largely meaningless. In redacting information, BSEE
broadly invoked exemptions from FOIA relating to “trade
secrets and commercial or financial information, obtained from
a person, which is privileged or confidential” and “personnel
and medical files and similar files, the disclosure of which
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy.” 132
These experiences demonstrate unnecessary roadblocks to
the public’s timely access to information submitted to BSEE.
The delays we experienced in receiving information exceed the
Region, BOEM, to Jean Tanis, student, EELPC, Harvard Law School (Feb. 26, 2014)
(on file with author).
130. Letter from Brendan Henry, Government Information Specialist, FOIA, Alaska
OCS Region, BSEE, to Jean Tanis, student, EELPC, Harvard Law School (Mar. 3,
2014) (on file with author); Letter from Janice R. Hall, FOIA Officer, Pacific OCS
Region, BSEE, to Jean Tanis, student, EELPC Harvard Law School (Mar. 25, 2014)
(on file with author); Letter from Karen M. Miller, FOIA Officer, Gulf of Mexico OCS
Region, BSEE, to Jean Tanis, student, EELPC, Harvard Law School (June 17, 2014)
(on file with author).
131. Email from Dorothy Tinker, BSEE FOIA Office, to Aladdine Joroff, Staff
Attorney, EELPC, Harvard Law School (May 1, 2014) (on file with author).
132. Letter from Dorothy Tinker, BSEE FOIA Office, to Aladdine Joroff, Staff
Attorney, EELPC, Harvard Law School (June 12, 2014) (on file with author).
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typical thirty to ninty-day comment periods on draft
regulations, illustrating the practical impact on stakeholders
using FOIA requests to enhance their ability to contribute to
discussions relevant to ensuring safe and environmentally
sound offshore drilling. Responses from BSEE are further
slowed by the need to go back-and-forth with industry
regarding material claimed to be business confidential. If
BSEE required industry to submit redacted versions of reports,
such as SEMS audit reports, along with original submissions,
those redacted materials could be promptly forwarded as a
placeholder in response to public inquiries while BSEE
prepares a formal response to FOIA requests. The quality of
responses is further impaired by inappropriately broad
applications of FOIA exemptions.
B.

BSEE’S REGULATIONS REQUIRE COLLABORATION
AMONG AGENCIES BUT DO NOT MANDATE
INFORMATION-SHARING

Numerous federal agencies play a role in offshore drilling
oversight, but greater coordination of efforts is needed. 133
Entities with a significant role include BSEE, BOEM, EPA,
and the USCG. Other agencies also play a role, albeit a more
limited one, including DOT and NOAA. While the stated goals
of many of these agencies include transparency and improved
information
management
to
ensure
environmental
protection, 134 the accessibility of the vast amounts of
information reported to these and other agencies remains
limited, not only to the public but also within and between
agencies. For instance, BSEE’s Regulations include only one
133. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,689, 80 Fed. Reg. 4,189 (Jan. 21, 2015)
(establishing an Arctic Executive Steering Committee tasked, in part, with enhancing
“coordination of Federal Arctic policies across agencies and offices, and, where
applicable, with State, local, and Alaska Native tribal governmental and similar
Alaska Native organizations, academic and research institutions, and the private and
nonprofit sectors.”).
134. See, e.g., BSEE FY 2012-2015 Strategic Goals at a Glance, BUREAU OF SAFETY
AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT, http://perma.cc/BFG4-XG8J (including in
BSEE’s strategic goals “[t]echnology and information management investment:
revamp data systems, knowledge management, and innovation”); EPA’s Themes—
PROTECTION
AGENCY,
Meeting
the
Challenge
Ahead,
ENVIRONMENTAL
http://perma.cc/EMX9-VT5J (“Integrating efforts with a new commitment to
innovation, the high-level use of data and information, partnerships, incentives, new
and expanded constituencies, and environmental education will build momentum.”).
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explicit example of intergovernmental collaboration, and it
relates to cooperation between BSEE and BOEM, its sister
division within DOI. 135 No provision within the Regulations
explicitly provides for sharing information with EPA, USCG,
NOAA or other agencies despite the directive to BSEE, both in
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act and the Regulations, to
cooperate and consult with “relevant federal agencies.”
BSEE relies on interagency agreements, e.g., MOUs and
MOAs, to facilitate intergovernmental collaboration and
information sharing. Examples include: (i) a 2012 MOU with
the USCG regarding the Outer Continental Shelf and a
subsequent MOA regarding SEMS and Safety Management,
both of which include information sharing provisions; 136 and
(ii) an interagency agreement with the Bureau of
Transportation Statistics to develop a voluntary confidential
near-miss reporting system for use on the Outer Continental
Shelf. 137
Such interagency agreements for sharing information are
hampered by limited participation, narrow coverage, lack of
benchmarks, and vague language. Existing interagency
agreements are often between only two agencies at a time
and/or address discrete issues. Achieving seamless information
sharing, however, requires a comprehensive solution that
accounts for all of the information reported to all agencies
involved in offshore drilling oversight, as well as making all of
that information accessible to other interested parties. 138 By
135. 30 C.F.R. § 250.135 (“BSEE will refer a determination of unacceptable
performance to BOEM”) (2012).
136. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding between BSEE and USCG re:
Building a Partnership to Improve Safety and Environmental Protection, at § F (Nov.
27, 2012) (requiring the participating agencies to “promote electronic information
sharing,” “endeavor to synchronize information” and “exchange or otherwise make
available . . . graphical representations depicting the geographical boundaries of each
agency’s regional offices and commands”); Memorandum of Agreement between BSEE
and USCG re: Safety and Environmental Management Systems and Safety
Management Systems (BSEE/USCG MOA: OCS-07), at § C.5 (April 30, 2013)
(providing for sharing of information related to the agencies respective “safety
management efforts,” including “[a]ny significant finding relevant to OCS safety and
environmental management”). Both of these documents, as well as other examples of
collaboration between BSEE and USCG, are available at BSEE, Cooperative and
Interagency Agreements, http://perma.cc/X8JY-28E9.
137. BTS and BSEE to Develop Confidential Near-Miss Reporting System, U.S.
DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, http://perma.cc/883F-W6MC.
138. See generally U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO), GAO-14-220,
MANAGING FOR RESULTS: IMPLEMENTATION APPROACHES USED TO ENHANCE
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their very nature, bilateral agreements cannot achieve these
goals. Progress is further hampered by agreements that do not
clearly state the obligations they impose or provide
mechanisms for determining whether goals are being met. For
instance, although BSEE’s MOA with the USCG regarding
SEMS programs directs the agencies to share information
about their “safety management efforts,” and gives two
examples of specific information to be shared, including “[a]ny
significant finding relevant to OCS safety and environmental
management,” the information sharing obligations are still
subject to subjective agency decision-making as to which
information is “significant” enough to share. Agreements with
provisions that outline specific requirements and mandate
evaluations of the collaborations’ effectiveness are likely to
produce more effective results.
Existing inefficiencies in information sharing can be
illustrated by the reports that are required in the event of an
“incident” related to offshore drilling activities. The USCG,
EPA, and BSEE each require a report that asks for similar, if
not duplicative, and potentially complementary information in
the event of an incident related to offshore drilling activities. 139
However, these agencies do not have formal agreements or
mechanisms to coordinate or streamline the information
collected upon the occurrence of an incident. Formally
coordinatingthe sharing of the information in these reports
would benefit the public, industry, and the agencies themselves
by ensuring that the reported information is consolidated. This
in turn would enable the publication of integrated information
through a single source that would be easy to find and access
by interested agencies and other parties.
One such interested agency that is often missing from the
discussion of oversight of offshore drilling is the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”). Although the SEC does not
directly regulate offshore drilling activities, it should be
included in efforts to improve offshore drilling oversight,
particularly as relates to information disclosure. The SEC

COLLABORATION IN INTERAGENCY GROUPS (2014) (identifying as key practices in
collaborative interagency mechanisms, among other factors, tools to monitor, evaluate
and report on results and inclusion of all relevant participants).
139. See, e.g., United States Coast Guard, Form CG-2692, Report of Marine
Casualty; 40 C.F.R. § 112.4(a)(7) (2013); 30 C.F.R. § 250.189(h) (2014).
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regulates all publicly-traded companies, 140 including those
engaged in offshore drilling activities. A basic principle of the
SEC’s reporting requirements is that companies must report
any information that is “material” to a reasonable investor in
deciding whether to buy, sell, or hold a company’s securities.
While the definition of what is “material” for SEC purposes is
itself a complex and debated issue, one can reasonably assume
that much of the information reported under the offshore
drilling regulatory scheme concerning safety, environmental
protection and incidents, especially when considered in the
aggregate, amounts to what many investors would consider
material information.
The concept of providing the SEC better access to
information relating to environmental impacts is not new. In a
2004 study, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”)
recommended that the SEC improve the tracking and
transparency of company filings, particularly in the realm of
environmental disclosures. 141 The SEC concurred with the
GAO’s findings. 142 Providing the SEC with access to
information reported by offshore drillers to other federal
agencies would be consistent with the GAO’s recommendations
and with the SEC’s previous efforts to improve its consideration
of environmental issues. For instance, in 1990 the SEC and
EPA had an agreement under which EPA provided the SEC
with quarterly enforcement-related data. 143 According to the
SEC, the value of this attempt at information sharing was
limited due, at least in part, to the SEC’s inability to analyze
the great volume of complex data it received from EPA. 144 This
type of problem could be addressed by integrating the SEC’s
data needs into information collection processes so that
material is submitted and shared in a format that matches the
140. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a – 77mm; (2012); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a – 78kk. (2012).
141. GAO, GAO-04-808, ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE: SEC SHOULD EXPLORE WAYS
TO IMPROVE TRACKING AND TRANSPARENCY OF INFORMATION, 1 (2004), available at
http://perma.cc/JD7A-N763 (“Environmental risks and liabilities are among the
conditions that, if undisclosed, could impair the public’s ability to make sound
investment decisions”).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 28.
144. Id. For example, EPA provided facility-specific information without identifying
the facility owner, but the SEC required the ownership information in order to make
use of the data.
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SEC’s role as the securities market regulator (e.g., ensuring
that information on a spill or chemical storage is linked to the
level of corporate identification that the SEC tracks).
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING ACCESS TO
INFORMATION
A.

ISSUE GUIDANCE CLARIFYING THAT BSEE ADOPTS
A PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF DISCLOSURE

Although the Regulations are arguably consistent with a
public disclosure default, they do not clearly incorporate such a
presumption and at times contain confusing language that
leads to inappropriate limitations on public access to nonconfidential information submitted to BSEE. To address these
shortcomings, BSEE should issue guidance for internal and
external purposes that confirms and clarifies how it intends to
meet its, and the administration’s, goals of making information
available to the public and responding to FOIA requests with a
presumption in favor of disclosure.
Examples of clarifications and directions that should be
provided in such guidance include:
•

Clarify that BSEE (i) interprets its Regulations as
providing a presumption of public access to
information related to safety and the environment,
and (ii) presumes that disclosure of such information
is “necessary” unless demonstrated otherwise (i.e.,
BSEE employees should assume a rebuttable
presumption of public need for information submitted
to BSEE);

•

Confirm that, pursuant to paragraph (b) of section
250.197, BSEE will release all lease and permit data
and information not on BSEE forms except as
specifically enumerated in that paragraph;

•

Confirm that the purpose of paragraph (c) of section
250.197 is to expand public access to otherwise
proprietary geophysical and geological data;

•

Direct BSEE employees to consistently exercise the
agency’s authority to request that reporting entities
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provide an additional “public-ready” copy of reports
submitted to BSEE allegedly containing business
confidential
information
(30
C.F.R.
section
250.186(b)); 145 and
•

Direct BSEE employees to increase the scope and
magnitude of discretionary releases of nonconfidential material on BSEE.gov and other
appropriate electronic sources.

These suggestions are consistent with federal guidance that
directs agencies to “exercise their discretion to make a broad
range of records available beyond the minimum required by
[FOIA],” and highlights their ability to make discretionary
disclosures of information, even if it falls under a FOIA
exemption, if not otherwise prohibited. 146
B.

FACILITATE PUBLIC ACCESS TO INFORMATION
THROUGH 30 C.F.R. PART 250 BY AMENDING BSEE
FORMS

BSEE’s Regulations are supposed to be interpreted so as to
make information the agency collects available to the public
unless specifically exempted from disclosure. As written,
however, the Regulations provide for expedited access to only a
portion of the information submitted to BSEE, namely, data
and information submitted on BSEE forms is supposed to be
publicly available upon submission, subject to enumerated
exceptions. Notably, the forms represent only a subset of the
information collected and used by BSEE in assessing safety
and environmental impacts. BSEE should expand the scope of
material subject to the immediate public disclosure
requirement in paragraph (a) of section 250.197 by instructing
operators to attach additional safety and environment-related
information to existing BSEE forms. Given the routine use of
electronic submissions, attaching additional documents to a
form would not be burdensome.
145. BSEE should conduct periodic, random inspections of “public-ready”
submissions to ensure that claims of protected information have a legal basis and that
redactions are not inappropriately broad.
146. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT GUIDE 11–12, 686
(2004).
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Where, however, electronic submissions are not available or
the norm, referenced documents could be deemed incorporated
by the submitter’s signature if not physically or electronically
attached to the relevant BSEE form. Although amending
BSEE forms in this manner is not required for public access to
information currently submitted in other formats, it would be a
means of implementing the directive, recommended above, to
expand the scope of material that should be promptly made
available to the public, including via BSEE’s public website.
Examples of BSEE forms that could be modified include
Well Activity Reports (BSEE-0133), Applications for Permits to
Modify (BSEE-0124), and End of Operations Reports (BSEE0125). For instance, Well Activity Reports, which operators
must submit weekly or daily depending on where they are
drilling, 147 could be amended by adding a line item asking
operators to list information related to safety and
environmental protection otherwise submitted to BSEE prior
to or in the relevant reporting period. With respect to daily or
weekly reports, operators would only need to attach new
information in the first applicable reporting period;
information would not need to be re-submitted on a weekly or
daily basis. This direction would be accompanied by a noninclusive list of responsive information, which would then be
attached to or incorporated as part of form BSEE-0133 itself.
Amending BSEE forms in this manner would not increase
the amount or type of information collected by BSEE, but
would merely change the submission process and, potentially,
the categories of information readily available for public
access. Because there would be no “substantive or material
modification” to BSEE’s previously-approved collection of
information, the agency could proceed by issuing a Notice to
Lessees (“NTL”) without triggering obligations under the
Paperwork Reduction Act. 148 BSEE issues NTLs as guidance
documents to “clarify, supplement, or provide more detail”
about requirements in the Regulations and to “outline what
147. 30 C.F.R. § 250.468 (2014) (requiring operators drilling in the (i) Gulf of Mexico
OCS Region or (ii) Pacific or Alaska OCS Regions to submit Well Activity Reports on a
weekly and daily basis respectively).
148. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501, 3507(h)(3) (2012) (providing that, once the Office of
Management and Budget (“OMB”) has approved a collection of information, an agency
may not make a “substantive or material” modification to the collection without OMB
approval.)
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[reporters] must provide as required information in [their]
various submissions.” 149 Historically, BSEE has determined
that many of its NTLs, including ones that designate the
format and timing of submissions of information, do not
impose additional information collection requirements subject
to the Paperwork Reduction Act. 150
C.

DEVELOP A SEARCHABLE ONLINE DATABASE
THAT AGGREGATES OPERATOR SUMBITTED
INFORMATION

The information collected by the various federal agencies
that oversee offshore drilling is fragmented, hindering efficient
information management and effective analysis of the impacts
of offshore drilling. A searchable, shared database would
reduce reporting burdens on industry and improve oversight.
Access to shared data can lead to more informed and
innovative analysis and ideas; as noted in the context of
scientific data, “[t]he power of digital information to catalyze
progress is limited only by the power of the human mind.” 151
Even agencies that do not directly regulate offshore drilling,
such as the SEC, would benefit from greater access to
streamlined data relevant to the safety and environmental
impacts of offshore drilling. Pursuant to its mandate to
“cooperate and consult with . . . relevant Federal agencies” in
the regulation of offshore oil and gas operations, BSEE and
BOEM should take action to facilitate information sharing
within and among agencies with a role or interest in the
oversight of offshore drilling.
To address the current deficiencies in agency information
sharing, BSEE and BOEM should reach out to and collaborate
with other relevant agencies to establish a centralized
electronic reporting system capable of aggregating operatorsubmitted information in a searchable online database. (This
outreach should include the SEC, which should participate
with other federal agencies in devising the mechanisms for
sharing information so that it can specify its information
149. 30 C.F.R. § 250.103. (2014).
150. See BSEE Notices to Lessees and Operators, http://perma.cc/56NR-ARR4
(listing active BSEE NTLs issued from 1998-2014).
151. INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON DIGITAL DATA, HARNESSING THE POWER OF
DIGITAL DATA FOR SCIENCE AND SOCIETY 4 (2009).
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needs.) The database should aggregate all information
submitted by offshore operators that is relevant to safety and
environmental performance and be made accessible to all
federal regulators and, except for information that is
confidential, the general public. 152 BSEE could use a multiagency MOA to develop such a centralized, electronic system
for collecting and processing information from regulated
offshore drilling entities.
A multi-agency MOA could build on current, often bilateral,
information-sharing efforts between agencies by expanding the
scope of existing agreements and establishing deadlines for
facilitating improved information sharing and access. In
particular, the signatories to the MOA could:
(i)

Compile a list of information reportable by offshore
drilling entities, organize such data by searchable
parameters, 153 and identify and address any gaps or
overlaps in reporting requirements. 154 In compiling
this list of information, the agencies should identify
which material is confidential and specify that the
rest is accessible to the public. Such an exercise
would help address ambiguities in BSEE’s
regulations as to which information it intends to
withhold from public access and for how long;

(ii)

Develop a computer application that provides a
streamlined method by which offshore facilities can

152. The Mine Safety and Health Administration (“MSHA”) and the Pipeline and
Hazardous Material Safety Administration (“PHMSA”) maintain searchable online
databases that could serve as models. See Mine Data Retrieval System, MINE SAFETY
AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, http://perma.cc/KA6J-BDEC (containing information
gathered from various MSHA systems); Pipeline Operator Information, PIPELINE AND
HAZARDOUS MATERIAL SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, http://perma.cc/KKE4-3YKV
(collecting operator information from multiple sources including operator reported and
internal PHMSA data).
153. Possible search parameters might include collection agency, date of submission,
type of disclosure (voluntary or mandatory), and circumstance of disclosure (periodic or
incident based).
154. The identification of reporting gaps and overlaps may be informed by the work
of the recently established Arctic Executive Steering Committee, which was tasked
with establishing a working group to “identify potential areas of overlap between and
within agencies with respect to implementation of Arctic policy and strategic priorities
and provide recommendations to increase coordination and reduce any duplication of
effort . . .”). Exec. Order No. 13689, 80 Fed. Reg. 4189 (Jan. 21, 2015).
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submit all required information electronically. This
system could include a graphical user interface that
would allow users to enter information for multiple
reports simultaneously. The system could also allow
facilities to submit confidential information
separately. (Figure 1 below presents a conceptualized
model for a graphical user interface screen that,
while not intended to be a final product, provides an
illustration of the idea); and
Figure 1: Conceptualized GUI Model

(iii)

Create a searchable database that includes all
reported information for use by all interested
regulators and, with respect to non-confidential
information, all other stakeholders and members of
the public.

While conceptual and design input from all relevant
agencies should be obtained early in the process, the computer
application and database could be developed in stages,
beginning with a pilot project to test the system and
incorporate stakeholder feedback. A possible funding
mechanism for the development and maintenance of such a
system would be license and permit fees.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Regulators, investors, affected communities and other
members of the general public who are interested in evaluating
the environmental performance of different operators have
some but not enough useful information at their disposal. Data
regarding an operator’s civil and administrative violations and
the well control incidents, explosions, fires, oil releases,
reportable injuries, and fatalities that occur at its facilities are
already publicly available on BSEE’s website. This information
provides important insights into an operator’s past safety and
environmental performance and the prospective risk its
operations pose.
Although existing information can provide important
insights, the implementation of robust environmental and
safety indicators requires improved access to information
generated by operators. For example, BSEE should require
operators to report their SPPE maintenance backlog, average
kick response time, and certain LOPC events that are
currently not reported. BSEE should also conduct periodic
surveys of an operator’s personnel to determine the strength of
the operator’s safety culture. This additional information will
provide important new insights into the safety and
environmental performance of offshore operators.
BSEE should also take steps to improve public access to, and
inter- and intra-agency sharing of, information that the agency
already collects from entities involved in offshore drilling.
Facilitating access to information is a critical step toward
effective oversight of offshore drilling and protection of human
health and the environment. Much can be done to achieve this
goal without creating additional substantive requirements for
or burdens on the regulated community, and would represent a
significant step by BSEE towards meeting its mandates to
proactively make information public and to cooperate and
coordinate with other federal agencies in the regulation and
oversight of offshore oil and gas operations.
Alleviating the need for the public to proceed under the often
lengthy FOIA process, and providing regulators immediate
access to information collected by other agencies, would
improve the ability of stakeholder and regulators alike to
monitor and assess the safety and environmental performance
of offshore operators. Such increased and timely access to
information is needed to help displace the “culture of
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complacency” that the National Commission identified in the
wake of the Deepwater Horizon tragedy. 155

155. NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 16, at ix, 293.
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